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MUDDYING THE WATER: TIERED WATER 
RATES AFTER SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO 
Travis Kaya* 
 
In the face of chronic drought, water utilities across 
California have turned to tiered water rates to promote 
conservation and curb consumer demand. However, recent 
legal challenges have called the constitutionality of tiered-
rate schemes into question, threatening to deprive utilities of 
a critical conservation tool. 
A patchwork of recent court decisions—the landmark 
Capistrano Taxpayers Association v. City of San Juan 
Capistrano most notable among them—have exposed an 
unresolved conflict between the California Constitution’s 
water rights and taxation provisions. Namely, how does 
Proposition 218’s restrictions on assessments for “property 
related services” apply to tiered water rates set by public 
water utilities? 
This article calls on the California courts to expressly 
acknowledge the existence of the constitutional conflict and 
to provide clear guidance on how to resolve it. Previous 
decisions have presented two potential solutions: (1) 
requiring that rates be calculated based on aggregate water 
supply costs across the entire system, or (2) requiring that 
rates be calculated based on atomized water supply costs to 
individual parcels. As this article argues, the latter method—
as adopted by the court in San Juan Capistrano—forces 
water utilities to undertake the impossible task of calculating 
individual water supply costs for millions of parcels. Courts 
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should instead require that rates be set based on aggregate 
costs across the entire system. 
Finally, this article looks at the legacy of the San Juan 
Capistrano decision and includes a case study of the Los 
Angeles Department of Water and Power’s rate scheme, 
which was introduced in San Juan Capistrano’s wake.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In California, drought has become the new normal. The state 
spent eight of the past ten years in drought, with 2012 to 2016 
representing the driest four-year period in a century of record-
keeping.1 As annual global temperatures reach record highs with each 
passing year,2 the specter of water scarcity in California will 
undoubtedly loom for decades to come. 
For California water providers, the drought has added increased 
complexity to the monumental task of delivering water to millions of 
customers across the state. Water utilities oversee a labyrinthine water 
supply system that begins with the collection of water from a variety 
of sources, including groundwater, surface water, and imported 
water.3 Utilities must then transmit, treat, store, and distribute the 
water to their many customers.4 
As the difficulties of collecting and distributing water mount 
during prolonged drought conditions, state and local agencies have 
taken significant steps to decrease consumer demand for water.5 
Utilities statewide have employed a combination of public education 
initiatives, mandatory use restrictions, and pricing schemes aimed at 
discouraging water waste.6 This approach fits squarely within a long-
standing rule in California—codified in article X, section 2 of the State 
Constitution—giving water utilities wide latitude to make “beneficial 
use” of water resources “to the fullest extent of which they are 
capable.”7 
 
 1. CAL. DEPT. OF WATER RES., DROUGHT AND WATER YEAR 2016: HOT AND DRY 
CONDITIONS CONTINUE (2016), http://www.water.ca.gov/water conditions/docs/a3065_Drought 
_8page_v8_FINALsm.pdf. 
 2. See Global Climate Report – December 2016, NOAA NAT’L CTRS. FOR ENVTL. INFO. 
(Jan. 2017), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/201612. 
 3. L.A. DEP’T. OF WATER & POWER, 2014 WATER SERVICE COST OF SERVICE STUDY, 
(2015), https://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/faces/ladwp/aboutus/a-financesandreports/a-fr-waterrares 
/a-fr-wr-rateactionreport (follow “Chapter 4: 2014 Water Service Cost of Service Study” 
hyperlink). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Drought response in California has been guided by a series of executive orders issued by 
Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. See Governor’s Conservation Executive Orders and 
Proclamations, CAL. WATER BOARDS, https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs 
/conservation_portal/executive_orders.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2018). 
 6. Elena Maggionni, Water Demand Management in Times of Drought: What Matters for 
Water Conservation, 51 WATER RES. RES. 125, 126 (2015). 
 7. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. 
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Tiered rate pricing and other market-based restrictions have 
proven effective tools in managing water demand.8 Under a “tiered 
rate” structure, water utilities set prices based on the volume of water 
used.9 If a consumer’s water-use exceeds the volume allotted in the 
base tier, then that consumer will be required to pay a higher rate for 
each unit of water used in excess of the base allotment.10 Due to the 
system’s effectiveness in suppressing demand, more than two-thirds 
of California water-providers had adopted some form of tiered rate 
system by 2015.11 
In recent years, however, anti-tax political organizations have 
challenged the constitutionality of tiered water rates.12 Balancing the 
California Constitution’s tax and water rights provisions, courts have 
not deemed tiered water rates unconstitutional per se, but have 
required water providers to link higher prices to higher supply costs.13 
Courts have differed, however, on exactly how utilities are 
required to quantify those costs. And these conflicting interpretations 
have created a complex and difficult-to-reconcile clash between the 
Constitution’s tax and water provisions. 
In 2013, the Sixth District of the California Court of Appeal, in 
Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency (“Pajaro”),14 
held that higher-tier fees could be set proportionally to the cost of 
providing water to a class of consumers, or even the system as a 
whole.15 Two years later, in the landmark Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n 
 
 8. Mary E. Renwick & Richard D. Green, Do Residential Water Demand Side Management 
Policies Measure Up? An Analysis of Eight California Water Agencies, 40 J. ENVTL. ECON. & 
MGMT. 37, 51 (2000). 
 9. CAL. WATER CODE § 372(a)(1) (West 2008). 
 10. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 372(a)(2)–(4) (West 2008). 
 11. Beau Yarbrough, California Drought: Court Rules Tiered Water Rates Violate State 
Constitution, MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 20, 2015, 12:36 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2015/ 
04/20/california-drought-court-rules-tiered-water-rates-violate-state-constitution/. 
 12. The Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association is among the most vocal opponents of tiered 
rate structures in California, challenging the rate structures of local water districts on state 
constitutional grounds. See Jon Coupal & Jack Cohen, Water Rates Under Prop. 218, HOWARD 
JARVIS TAXPAYERS ASS’N, https://www.hjta.org/propositions/proposition-218/water-rates-under-
proposition-218/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2017). 
 13. See, e.g., Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
362, 380–81 (Ct. App. 2015) (“Neither the voters nor the Constitution say anything we can find 
that would prohibit tiered pricing . . . . However, if a local government body chooses to impose 
tiered rates unilaterally without a vote, those tiers must be based on cost of service for the 
incremental level of usage . . . .”). 
 14. 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 15. Id. at 255. 
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v. City of San Juan Capistrano16 case, however, the Fourth District of 
the Court of Appeal apparently extended the rule to require utilities to 
justify fees based on the cost of supplying water to individual 
parcels.17 However, the court also seemed to leave the door open to 
pricing schemes based on smaller groupings of customers, while 
stopping short of stating the acceptable make-up of those groups.18 
This Article gives two critiques of the San Juan Capistrano rule. 
First, courts must acknowledge—and then reconcile—the obvious 
clash between the California Constitution’s water rights and tax 
provisions. Second, rather than requiring utilities to link higher-tier 
rates to water supply costs for millions of individual parcels, the courts 
should return to the Pajaro court’s rule that utilities should be free to 
set tiered rates based on system-wide supply costs. 
Part II defines tiered rate structures, and explains why water 
utilities and government agencies have found them such a useful tool 
in their water conservation efforts. 
Presenting my first critique, Part III describes the conflict 
between the California Constitution’s water and tax provisions, and 
argues that the courts must first acknowledge, and then resolve, the 
conflict. 
Presenting my second critique, Part IV first provides an overview 
of the California Supreme Court’s landmark decision in San Juan 
Capistrano, then points out key inconsistencies in the court’s 
interpretation of the California Constitution and Water Code. Part IV 
also proposes two possible methods for resolving those 
inconsistencies, then advocates for a return to the Pajaro rule. 
Finally, Part V presents analysis of newly implemented tiered 
water rates in the wake of San Juan Capistrano, and includes a case 
study of rate structures from the Los Angeles Department of Water 
and Power. 
 
 16. 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 362. 
 17. Id. at 372 (“Why use the phrase ‘cost of the service to the parcel’ if a local agency doesn’t 
actually have to ascertain a cost of service to that particular parcel?”). 
 18. Id. at 381 (stating that while fees must match costs for individual parcels, the quantification 
of costs for individual households may not necessarily need to be calculated separately). 
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II.  TIERED RATE STRUCTURES: WHAT ARE THEY AND  
WHY DO THEY MATTER? 
Due to chronic scarcity, water providers across California have 
turned to customer-use restrictions to suppress demand. Tiered water 
rates are among their most important tools. 
This section provides a description of tiered water rates and how 
they are set, then gives an overview of statistical studies showing why 
tiered rates have been such a reliable tool in the conservation fight. 
A.  Defining Tiered Water Rates 
Tiered rate structures are set based on metered water use.19 Each 
customer is assigned a “basic use allocation” which provides a 
“reasonable amount of water for the consumer’s needs and property 
characteristics.”20 Utilities charge a base rate for water used within 
that allocation.21 Beyond that, the utility is allowed to impose a 
conservation charge on all water used in excess of the basic use 
allocation.22 Under California Water Code section 372: 
The increments may be fixed or may be determined on a 
percentage or any other basis, without limitation on the 
number of increments, or any requirement that the 
increments or conservation charges be sized, or ascend 
uniformly, or in a specified relationship. The volumetric 
prices for the lowest through the highest priced increments 
shall be established in an ascending relationship that is 
economically structured to encourage conservation and 
reduce the inefficient use of water, consistent with Section 2 
of Article X of the California Constitution.23 
Water providers are free to set their rate structures based on the 
unique needs and challenges of their communities.24 For example, in 
2010, the City of San Juan Capistrano—acting in its capacity as a 
 
 19. CAL. WATER CODE § 372(a)(1) (West 2008). 
 20. Id. § 372(a)(2). 
 21. Id. § 372(a)(3). 
 22. Id. § 372(a)(4). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Water providers in California include a multitude of special district and municipal 
agencies, including municipal water districts, irrigation districts, county water districts and cities 
themselves. See Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 
365 (Ct. App. 2015). 
51.3_KAYA_V.8.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/19  3:00 PM 
546 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:539 
water utility—implemented a four-tiered rate structure calculated as 
follows: 
It first ascertained its total costs, including things like debt 
service on previous infrastructural improvements. It then 
identified components of its costs, such as the cost of billing 
and the cost of water treatment. Next it identified classes of 
customers, differentiating, for example, between “regular 
lot” residential customers and “large lot” residential 
customers, and between construction customers and 
agricultural customers. Then, in regard to each class, [the 
City] calculated four possible budgets for water usage, based 
on historical data of usage patterns: low, reasonable, 
excessive and very excessive.25 
B.  Why Utilities Favor Tiered Rate Structures 
Water utilities and local governments rely heavily on local fees 
and taxes to fund their operations.26 “[E]ighty-five percent of the more 
than thirty billion dollars spent annually on water supply, quality, 
flood and ecosystem management” are raised through local fees and 
taxes every year.27 
On the demand side, residential consumption is a major 
component of total demand.28 Thus, reducing residential consumption 
is a major focus of efforts to conserve the water supply.29 
Local governments and utilities generally employ one of three 
types of restrictions to target water use: voluntary restrictions, 
mandatory restrictions, and market-based restrictions.30 
Voluntary restrictions—including education programs and 
incentives or rebates—encourage consumers to participate voluntarily 
in water conservation efforts.31 California municipalities and water 
agencies have been dedicated to the state-wide implementation of 
 
 25. Id. at 365–66. 
 26. See Brian Gray et al., Paying for Water in California: The Legal Framework, 65 
HASTINGS L.J. 1603, 1603 (2014). 
 27. Id. at 1604. 
 28. Md. Mahmudul Haque et al., Quantification of Water Savings due to Drought Restrictions 
in Water Demand Forecasting Models, 140 J. WATER RES. PLAN. MGMT. 1, 1 (2013). 
 29. See Ryan Cahill & Jay Lund, Residential Water Conservation in Australia and California, 
139 J. WATER RES. PLAN. MGMT. 117, 119 (2013). 
 30. Maggionni, supra note 6, at 128. 
 31. See id. at 128–29. 
51.3_KAYA_V.8.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/19  3:00 PM 
2018] CRITIQUING SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO 547 
voluntary water conservation programs.32 Despite buy-in from a wide 
array of water agencies, however, there is little evidence that the 
measures have directly led to water-use reductions.33 Voluntary 
restrictions must therefore be buttressed by more stringent use 
controls.34 
Mandatory restrictions—including outdoor watering restrictions 
and fines for failing to fix leaks—impose water use requirements on 
consumers by fiat.35 While mandatory restrictions have been shown to 
reduce water usage, the benefits of government-imposed mandates are 
often limited and inconsistent.36 
Market-based restrictions—including tiered rate structures—use 
prices to influence consumer behavior.37 Under a tiered-rate scheme, 
rates increase along with water consumption to suppress demand.38 
Price-based restrictions are an effective method for stimulating water 
conservation at the household level.39 However, their effectiveness 
depends heavily on the elasticity of water demand to price, urban 
density (i.e., the prevalence of residential outdoor landscaping), and 
consumer attitudes toward conservation.40 
“[R]esidential water demand is relatively price-elastic,” meaning 
that increases in water rates dependably lead to decreases in 
consumption by individual households.41 In addition, price-elasticity 
 
 32. Sara Hughes, Voluntary Environmental Programs in the Public Sector: Evaluating an 
Urban Water Conservation Program in California, 40 POL’Y STUD. J. 650, 659 (2012) (noting that 
more than 100 California water agencies have participated in a statewide Memorandum of 
Understanding to implement a menu of water conservation measures). 
 33. Id. at 667 (noting that, for water agencies, signing the MOU might be more of a political 
tool than a means to target water consumption); see also Renwick & Green, supra note 8, at 51 
(“More stringent mandatory policies, such as use restrictions and water allocations, reduced 
aggregate demand more than voluntary measures, such as public information campaigns and retrofit 
subsidies.”). 
 34. Renwick & Green, supra note 8, at 51. 
 35. Maggioni, supra note 6, at 128. 
 36. See id. (citing a long line of studies of water-saving policies that produced mixed results); 
Heather E. Campbell et al., Prices, Devices, People, or Rules: The Relative Effectiveness of Policy 
Instruments in Water Conservation, 21 REV. OF POL’Y RES. 637, 653–54 (2004) (finding that 
water-waste enforcement measures alone led to an increase in water consumption, but that a 
combination of water conservation measures working in concert contributed to a 3.5 percent 
decrease in overall water use). 
 37. See Maggioni, supra note 6, at 127. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Renwick & Green, supra note 8, at 51 (“Aggregate single family household demand 
was responsive to price changes.”). 
 40. Maggionni, supra note 6, at 125. 
 41. Jasper M. Dalhuisen et al., Price and Income Elasticities of Residential Water, 79 LAND 
ECON. 292, 306 (2003); see also Andrew C. Worthington & Mark Hoffman, An Empirical Survey 
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is significantly higher where there are ascending block rates, or tiered 
rates, in place.42 Therefore, tiered rate structures can be an effective 
tool for managing consumer water demand. 
Water agencies have seen the highest reduction in water use when 
they have implemented voluntary, mandatory, and market-based 
restrictions in concert.43 A statistical analysis of consumer demand in 
Los Angeles during the implementation of water use restrictions from 
2008 to 2010 showed that voluntary restrictions did not impact 
demand, while mandatory restrictions coupled with rate increases 
yielded the highest reduction in water use.44 Between 2009 and 2010, 
water use in Los Angeles fell between 19 and 23 percent “due to a 
combination of stringent mandatory restrictions that included limiting 
irrigation to two days per week, limiting the time and frequency of 
irrigation, a water rate increase and a decrease in the household 
allocation quantity.”45 
III.  CRITIQUE NO. 1: IGNORING A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT 
Legal battles over tiered water rates have unearthed a conflict 
between two major provisions of the California constitution—article 
X, section 2, which addresses water rights, and articles XIII C and XIII 
D, which addresses voters’ right to authorize taxes and fees. This 
section provides an overview of the pertinent California constitutional 
provisions and case law on water rates. While courts have found ways 
to harmonize the two provisions,46 this section will argue that the 
provisions may not be so easily reconciled based on the development 
of relevant law over the past eight decades. Moving forward, courts 
must first make clear that the conflict exists, and, second, provide clear 
guidance on how it should be resolved. 
 
of Residential Water Demand Modelling, 22 J. ECON. SURVS. 842, 867 (2008) (“Price elasticity 
estimates are generally found in the range of zero to 0.5 in the short run and 0.5 to unity in the long 
run.”). 
 42. Dalhuisen et al., supra note 41, at 297. 
 43. See C. Mini et al., The Effectiveness of Water Conservation Measures on Summer 
Residential Water Use in Los Angeles, California, 94 RES. CONSERVATION & RECYCLING 136, 
141 (2014). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 144. 
 46. See, e.g., City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373, 381 (Ct. App. 
2011) (holding that a water district was required to comply with both constitutional provisions in 
setting tiered rates); see also Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 362, 374–77 (Ct. App. 2015) (holding that the constitutional provisions were compatible). 
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A.  Article X, Section 2 – The Water Rights Provision 
1.  Text and History 
Article X, section 2 of the California Constitution47 declares that: 
[B]ecause of the conditions prevailing in this State the 
general welfare requires that the water resources of the State 
be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are 
capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or 
unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that 
the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view 
to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of 
the people and for the public welfare.48 
The amendment was shaped by the tension between the rights of 
“riparian” landowners and those of appropriators seeking access to 
water.49 Under the common law, riparian owners—those with property 
abutting free-flowing water sources—traditionally had unlimited use 
of that water,50 and could deny access to downstream landowners and 
anyone else seeking access to it.51 Concerned that unfettered riparian 
rights would cut off water sources for California’s burgeoning 
population centers downstream, the governor and state legislators 
pushed for a voter initiative to write a “reasonable use” restriction into 
the California Constitution.52 With voter approval, the water rights 
amendment became part of the state’s constitution in 1928.53 
Proponents of the amendment sought specifically to overrule the 
1926 California Supreme Court decision in Herminghaus v. Southern 
California Edison,54 which enjoined a public utility from constructing 
a dam across the San Joaquin River because it would interfere too 
 
 47. At the time of its adoption, the constitution’s water rights provision was codified as article 
XIV, section 3. The provision was reenacted verbatim and recodified as article X, section 2 on June 
6, 1976. Brian E. Gray, “In Search of Bigfoot”: The Common Law Origins of Article X, Section 2 
of the California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 225, 225 n.1 (1989) [hereinafter Bigfoot]. 
 48. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. 
 49. See Bigfoot, supra note 47, at 260; see also Harrison C. Dunning, Article X, Section 2: 
From Maximum Water Development to Instream Flow Protection, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 
276–77 (1989). 
 50. See Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607, 613 (Cal. 1926). 
 51. Bigfoot, supra note 47, at 260. 
 52. Id. at 264. 
 53. Id. at 263. 
 54. 252 P. 607 (Cal. 1926).  
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heavily with the riparian rights of downstream landowners.55 In siding 
with the landowners, the Herminghaus court reaffirmed the long-
standing California property law doctrine that “the rights of the 
riparian owners to the use of the waters of the abutting stream were 
paramount to the rights of any other persons thereto.”56 
The Herminghaus court acknowledged, then rebuked, the gradual 
softening of legal protections for riparian landowners.57 In the decades 
leading up to Herminghaus, the California Supreme Court found that 
the “reasonable use doctrine” limited riparian rights where the greater 
social benefit outweighed the private benefit in Southern California 
Investment Co. v. Wilshire,58 and again in Half Moon Bay Land Co. v. 
Cowell.5960 In dicta, the Herminghaus court suggested that the state 
might be able to use its police power to implement “some general plan 
or system for the equitable adjustment of rights and uses in its flowing 
streams with a view to the conservation, development, and 
distribution . . . of their waters.”61 While opening the door to potential 
limitations on riparian rights, however, the Herminghaus decision 
expressly applied “only as between different riparian proprietors.”62 
The government would therefore still be required to exercise its 
eminent domain power when the “higher interests of the public” called 
for interference with private riparian rights.63 Fearful that court 
 
 55. Id. at 613; see Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 725 (Cal. 1983); 
Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 375 (Ct. App. 
2015); Light v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 210 (Ct. App. 2014). 
 56. Herminghaus, 252 P. at 613; see also Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 753 (Cal. 1886) (“[T]he 
right to a water-course begins ex jure naturae, and, having taken a certain course naturally, it cannot 
be diverted to the deprivation of the rights of the riparian owners below.”) (emphasis in original); 
Ferrea v. Knipe, 28 Cal. 340, 343–44 (1865) (“Every proprietor of lands through or adjoining which 
a water-course passes has a right to a reasonable use of the water; but he has no right to so 
appropriate it as to unnecessarily diminish the quantity in its natural flow.”). 
 57. Bigfoot, supra note 47, at 261 (citing Herminghaus, 252 P. at 621–22). 
 58. 77 P. 767 (Cal. 1904).  
 59. 160 P. 675 (Cal. 1916).  
 60. Half Moon Bay, 160 P. at 678 (“[W]hen the water is insufficient for all the land or for all 
of the uses to which it might be applied thereon, and there is enough only for that use which is most 
valuable and profitable, the shares may properly be limited to and measured by the quantity 
sufficient for that use, and the proportions fixed accordingly.”); S. Cal. Inv. Co., 77 P. at 768 (“[I]n 
cases where there is not water enough to supply the wants of both, that each owner has the right to 
the reasonable use of the water, taking into consideration the rights and necessities of the other.”); 
Bigfoot, supra note 47, at 261 (citing Herminghaus, 252 P. at 621). 
 61. Bigfoot, supra note 47, at 261 (citing Herminghaus, 252 P. at 621). 
 62. Herminghaus, 252 P. at 615; see also Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 88 P. 978, 980 
(Cal. 1907) (holding that the owner of a tract of land not abutting a river could not claim riparian 
rights to use the river water). 
 63. Herminghaus, 252 P. at 615. 
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protection of riparian rights would further limit access to water for 
growing downstream communities, the governor and state legislature 
helped place water rights reform on the 1928 ballot.64 
With the passage of the 1928 referendum and addition of the 
water rights amendment, California voters uprooted existing case law 
to limit private water rights for the greater public benefit.65 For the 
first time, the constitution rendered “available for beneficial use that 
portion of the waters of our rivers and streams which . . . was of no 
substantial benefit to the riparian owner.”66 The amendment also 
removed the need for the state to exercise its eminent domain power 
to protect the state’s water, and placed it instead “within the sphere of 
the police power.”67 
Interpreting the 1928 amendment in subsequent decisions, the 
California Supreme Court “relied on the doctrine of reasonable use to 
decide that an appropriation should take precedence over the rights of 
downstream riparians.”68 Significantly, in Peabody v. City of 
Vallejo,69 the court held that a water appropriator could “enter[] a field 
of water supply and seek by appropriation to take water from such 
supply” where there was more than sufficient water for “all reasonable 
beneficial uses” by the riparian owner.70 
2.  Supporting Statutes 
Since 1928, the legislature has expanded state water law by way 
of the California Water Code and provisions in the California 
Government Code. 
California Government Code section 53750 defines “water” as 
“any system of public improvements intended to provide for the 
production, storage, supply, treatment, or distribution of water from 
any source.”71 In its 2014 amendment to section 53750, the state 
legislature expressly expanded the meaning of “water” under 
California law to include potable and nonpotable water “from any 
 
 64. Bigfoot, supra note 47, at 263. 
 65. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22 P.2d 5, 16 (Cal. 1933). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Bigfoot, supra note 47, at 265. 
 69. 40 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1935). 
 70. Id. at 498. 
 71. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53750 (West 2014). 
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source.”72 The legislature also expressly stated that “the use of potable 
domestic water for nonpotable uses, including, but not limited to, 
cemeteries, golf courses, parks, highway landscaped areas, and 
industrial and irrigation uses, is a waste or an unreasonable use of the 
water . . . if recycled water is available.”73 
Following the passage of Proposition 218 (“Prop 218”) to amend 
the California Constitution, discussed infra, the legislature also passed 
California Government Code section 53756 to guide water utilities on 
how to set rates and schedule rate increases in compliance with the 
constitution’s new tax and fee restrictions.74 Section 53756 allows 
water utilities to adopt automatic water rate increases, including 
adjustments for inflation, so long as the “fee or charge for a property-
related service” does “not exceed the cost of providing that service.”75 
The California Water Code also governs the acquisition and 
maintenance of water rights, especially with regard to governmental 
control of water.76 Two provisions are especially germane to the 
discussion of tiered water rates. 
California Water Code section 31020 states that a “district may 
do any act necessary to furnish sufficient water in the district for any 
present or future beneficial use.”77 In applying the statute, the San 
Juan Capistrano court held that a water district could therefore 
increase consumer rates to fund a planned recycled water 
infrastructure project, even if the consumers were not yet reaping its 
benefits.78 
In addition, California Water Code section 372 provides detailed 
criteria for “allocation-based conservation water pricing,” which 
encompasses many of the extant tiered rate schemes across the state.79 
 
 72. Legis. Serv., Assemb. B. 2403, Ch. 78 (Cal. 2014). Similarly, in San Juan Capistrano, the 
court held “water to be part of a holistic distribution system that does not distinguish between 
potable and non-potable water.” Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 370 (Ct. App. 2015). 
 73. Legis. Serv., Assemb. B. 2403, Ch. 78 (Cal. 2014). 
 74. Legis. Serv., Assemb. B. 761, Ch. 611 (Cal. 2008). 
 75. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53756(b) (West 2012). 
 76. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 372 (West 2008); CAL. WATER CODE § 31020 (West 
1949). 
 77. CAL. WATER CODE § 31020 (West 1949) (emphasis added). 
 78. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 370–
71 (Ct. App. 2015). Still, the court found the record insufficient to determine whether utilities could 
require “superconservers” to pay for recycling facilities “that would not be necessary but for above-
average consumption.” Id. 
 79. CAL. WATER CODE § 372 (West 2008). 
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Under section 372, a utility may employ “allocation-based 
conservation water pricing” if the pricing scheme meets the following 
four criteria:  
First, billing must be based on “metered water use.”80 
Second, utilities must establish a “basic use allocation . . . for 
each customer account that provides a reasonable amount of water for 
the customer’s needs and property characteristics.”81 To calculate the 
individual allocations, utilities may consider, inter alia, “the number 
of occupants, the type or classification of use, the size of lot or 
irrigated area, and the local climate data for the billing period.”82 
Third, a “basic charge” must be imposed “for all water used 
within the customer’s basic use allocation. . . .”83 However, public 
entities may lower rates for a portion of the water used if the reduction 
is the result of “superior or more than reasonable conservation efforts” 
by the consumer.84 
Fourth, a “conservation charge shall be imposed on all increments 
of water use in excess of the basic use allocation.”85 Utilities have the 
power to set the number and structure of the increments “to encourage 
conservation and reduce the inefficient use of water, consistent with 
section 2 of article X of the California Constitution.”86 
Section 372 and California water laws in general appear to 
provide clear cover for tiered water rates. Given California’s growing 
list of restrictions on taxes and fees,87 however, water utilities may not 
have such an easy time designing tiered rate structures that do not run 
afoul of the state constitution. 
 
 80. Id. § 372(a)(1). 
 81. Id. § 372(a)(2). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, D. 
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B.  Articles XIII, C and D – The Tax Provisions 
1.  Text and History 
In rejecting tiered water rates, courts have drawn heavily on 
articles XIII C and D of the California Constitution.88 Both 
amendments took effect in 1996 with the passage of Prop 218, a ballot 
initiative requiring voter approval for the majority of tax and fee 
increases by government bodies in the state.89 
Article XIII C requires voter approval for “tax levies” by local 
governments.90 The amendment creates two categories of taxes: 
general taxes and special taxes.91 “General taxes” are “imposed for 
general governmental purposes” and can only be assessed by local 
governments.92 Thus, “special purpose districts or agencies” are 
prohibited from levying general taxes.93 Under the amendment, “[n]o 
local government may impose, extend, or increase any general tax 
unless and until that tax is submitted to the electorate and approved by 
a majority vote.”94 On the other hand, “special taxes” are imposed for 
“specific purposes,” such as one-off infrastructure development 
projects.95 Under the amendment, “[n]o local government may 
impose, extend, or increase any special tax unless and until that tax is 
submitted to the electorate and approved by a two-thirds vote.”96 
However, the amendment does exempt a number of taxes and fees 
from the ballot requirement. Local governments may, for example, 
assess penalties and fines without voter approval.97 
Where article XIII C applies to taxes, article XIII D applies to “all 
assessments, fees and charges, whether imposed pursuant to state 
statute or local government charter authority.”98 Article XIII D, 
section 6 applies particularly to “Property Related Fees and Charges,” 
 
 88. See, e.g., Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
362, 369 (Ct. App. 2015); Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 
255–56 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 89. Gray et al., supra note 26, at 1612–13. 
 90. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 2(a)–(c). 
 91. Id. 
 92. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(a). 
 93. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 2(a). 
 94. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 2(b) (emphasis added). 
 95. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(d). 
 96. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 2(d) (emphasis added). 
 97. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e)(5). 
 98. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 1. 
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and includes “Requirements for Existing, New or Increased Fees and 
Charges.”99 Section 6, subsection b states, in part: 
(1) Revenues derived from the fee or charge shall not exceed 
the funds required to provide the property related service. 
(2) Revenues derived from the fee or charge shall not be used 
for any purpose other than that for which the fee or charge 
was imposed. 
(3) The amount of a fee or charge imposed upon any parcel 
or person as an incident of property ownership shall not 
exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the 
parcel. 
(4) No fee or charge may be imposed for a service unless that 
service is actually used by, or immediately available to, the 
owner of the property in question. Fees or charges based on 
potential or future use of a service are not permitted. Standby 
charges, whether characterized as charges or assessments, 
shall be classified as assessments and shall not be imposed 
without compliance with Section 4.100 
2.  Propositions 13, 218, and 26 
Article XIII is best understood within the context of California’s 
decades-long debate over the voters’ right to approve taxes, and the 
three ballot propositions that animate it: Propositions 13, 218, and 
26.101 
Proposition 13 (“Prop 13”)—passed by popular vote on June 6, 
1978—limited property taxes to one percent of each parcel’s estimated 
value, and capped price increases at two percent annually.102 Prop 13 
also required majority voter approval for “special taxes” to pay for 
specific government programs.103 While water fees themselves were 
not considered “special taxes” and were therefore exempt from the 
voter approval requirement, Prop 13’s restrictions on property taxes 
cut deeply into available revenue for water utilities.104 
 
 99. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 6. 
 100. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 6(b). 
 101. Gray et al., supra note 26, at 1608. 
 102. Id. at 1610. 
 103. Understanding Proposition 218, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (Dec. 1996), 
https://lao.ca.gov/1996/120196_prop_218/understanding_prop218_1296.html.  
 104. Gray et al., supra note 26, at 1610. 
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During the two decades following the passage of Prop 13, local 
governments and utilities circumvented the new cap on property taxes 
through the use of assessments, property-related fees and general 
purpose taxes.105 As a result, Prop 218 aimed to close those alternative 
avenues of government funding in the same way that Prop 13 did for 
property taxes.106 Following its passage on November 5, 1996, Prop 
218 added articles XIII C and XIII D to the California Constitution.107 
Among other changes to California tax law, Prop 218: 
(1) Clarifies that “general taxes” require a majority of voter 
approval, while “special taxes” require a two-thirds vote. 
(2) Prohibits special districts from levying general taxes, thus 
requiring water utilities to fund projects and programs 
through “special taxes” approved by a two-thirds vote. 
(3) Places the burden of proof on local agencies to show that 
the benefit conferred to each parcel is proportionate to the 
rate of the assessment. 
(4) Requires that proposed assessments be approved in an 
election in which votes are weighted by the amount of 
assessment paid by each parcel owner.108 
Prop 218 also established new standards for fees and charges 
levied for any “property-related service.”109 Despite early confusion 
about Prop 218’s applicability to water rates, state courts have since 
established that once a water source has been connected to a property, 
water supply becomes a “property-related service” subject to Prop 
218.110 In addition, Prop 218—as interpreted in subsequent years by 
the courts—placed the burden on water utilities to prove that the price 
assessed to each parcel does not exceed the cost of providing water to 
each parcel.111 
In an attempt to close remaining loopholes in the tax law, 
California voters enacted Proposition 26 (“Prop 26”)—the latest of the 
 
 105. Understanding Proposition 218, supra note 103; see also Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Ass’n 
v. Garner, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703, 705–06 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 106. Understanding Proposition 218, supra note 103.  
 107. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C. 
 108. Gray et al., supra note 26, at 1610–11. 
 109. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D. 
 110. Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil, 138 P.3d 220, 225 (Cal. 2006); see 
Richmond v. Shasta Cmty. Servs. Dist., 83 P.3d 518, 528 (Cal. 2004). 
 111. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D. 
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three constitutional tax amendments—on November 10, 2010.112 Prop 
26 amended Prop 13 to require that changes in state law resulting in 
“any taxpayer paying higher tax” be enacted by a two-thirds vote of 
the state legislature.113 Previously, under Prop 13, the legislature could 
avoid the two-thirds vote requirement by enacting taxes that were 
“revenue neutral” overall, even if it raised taxes for some people and 
reduced them for others.114 
C.  Conflicts Emerge in the Case Law 
Over the past decade, a stream of state appellate decisions has 
defined the constitutional tax provisions as they apply to water rights. 
This section traces the birth and development of the ongoing conflict 
between the constitution’s water and tax provisions. 
After the passage of Prop 218, it was unclear to water utilities and 
the courts whether the resulting constitutional amendment, which 
applied expressly to all “assessments, fees and charges,” had any 
impact on water rates at all.115 In Richmond v. Shasta Community 
Services District,116 the court distinguished between assessments for 
“new service connections” and for supplying water once the 
connections had been made.117 The court reasoned that because the 
one-time connection fee was assessed “only on individuals who 
request a new service connection, the capacity charge is not an 
assessment within the meaning of article XIII D.”118 
Two years later in Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. 
Verjil,119 the court affirmatively extended Prop 218’s restrictions on 
taxes and fees to assessments by water utilities.120 The court held that: 
Once a property owner or resident has paid the connection 
charges and has become a customer of a public water agency, 
all charges for water delivery incurred thereafter are charges 
for a property related service, whether the charge is 
 
 112. Gray et al., supra note 26, at 1614. 
 113. Id. (emphasis added). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Richmond, 83 P.3d at 520. 
 116. 83 P.3d 518 (Cal. 2004). 
 117. Id. at 523. 
 118. Id. 
 119. 138 P.3d 220 (Cal. 2006). 
 120. Id. at 224. 
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calculated on the basis of consumption or is imposed as a 
fixed monthly fee.121 
Once the courts affirmed that water fees fell within the scope of 
Prop 218, they faced questions regarding the way utilities were 
permitted to set their rates. 
In City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water District,122 the court 
barred rate differentiation for different classes of users.123 The court 
held that a water utility could not charge “irrigation users”—i.e., 
farmers—at a higher rate than residential and commercial users, where 
there was no showing that providing water to irrigation users was 
relatively more expensive.124 
Two years later in Pajaro, the California Court of Appeal held 
that a water utility could uniformly charge all users for the cost of an 
infrastructure project, even if some parcel owners did not receive any 
of the newly sourced water.125 The court held: 
Given that Proposition 218 prescribes no particular method 
for apportioning a fee or charge other than that the amount 
shall not exceed the proportional cost of the service 
attributable to the parcel, defendant’s method of grouping 
similar users together for the same augmentation rate and 
charging the users according to usage is a reasonable way to 
apportion the cost of service.126 
Despite attempts by water utilities to defeat Prop 218 with article 
X, section 2’s facially sweeping mandate that water “be put to 
beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they [water utilities] are 
 
 121. Id. at 227. 
 122. 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 123. See id. at 381 (“[I]t is the irrigation-only user . . . who is ‘potentially the most impacted,’ 
without a corresponding showing in the record that such impact is justified under Article X, section 
2, or permissible under Article XIII D, section 6.”). 
 124. Id. at 379. 
 125. Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 254–55 (Ct. App. 
2013). Distinguishing the Palmdale decision, the Pajaro court held that the fees could be 
implemented uniformly across a system so long as there was no discrimination among different 
user classes. Id. at 255. 
 126. Id. (emphasis added). 
51.3_KAYA_V.8.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/19  3:00 PM 
2018] CRITIQUING SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO 559 
capable,”127 California courts found it possible—perhaps, even 
preferable—for water utilities to comply with both.128 
In Palmdale, for example, a water district argued that its tiered 
rate structure was beyond the reach of Prop 218 because the district 
was “entitled to promote conservation” under article X.129 However, 
the court rejected the argument, finding that the district could comply 
with both constitutional provisions so long as “conservation is attained 
in a manner that shall not exceed the proportional cost of the service 
attributable to the parcel.”130 
Going a step further, the San Juan Capistrano court found that 
pricing water at its true cost was not just possible, but actually 
“compatible with [article X, section 2’s] theme of conservation” 
because higher water prices could disincentivize water use during 
times of drought.131 Therefore, under the courts’ recent decisions, it 
appears that article X, section 2 provides little protection against 
challenges to tiered rate structures on Prop 218 grounds. 
D.  Addressing the Conflict 
The water rights and tax provisions of the constitution create an 
unavoidable conflict when it comes to tiered rates. In attempting to 
harmonize the provisions, courts have dodged the obvious conflict and 
instead allowed tiered rate structures to exist in a toothless form. By 
allowing tiered rate structures that cap rates only at the market cost for 
providing water to individual parcels, the courts have barred utilities 
from setting rates high enough to discourage use by water-guzzlers—
the very raison d’être of tiered water rates.132 Moving forward, the 
 
 127. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; see also Newhall Cty. Water Dist. v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 
197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 429, 442 (Ct. App. 2016) (“The Agency attempts to justify the challenged rates 
by relying on the conservation mandate in the California Constitution . . . .”); Capistrano Taxpayers 
Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 374 (Ct. App. 2015) (water utility 
argues that tiered water rates need not correlate with actual cost of supplying water because 
subsidized rates are “somehow required by article X, section 2”); City of Palmdale v. Palmdale 
Water Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373, 379 (Ct. App. 2011) (water district “says it is entitled to promote 
conservation in such a manner pursuant to article X, section 2, of the California Constitution”). 
 128. Newhall Cty. Water Dist., 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 443. 
 129. Palmdale, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 379. 
 130. Id. at 381 (internal citations omitted); see also Newhall Cty. Water Dist., 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
at 443 (“Moreover, article X’s conservation mandate cannot be read to eliminate Prop 26’s 
proportionality requirement.”); San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 376 (“[N]othing in article 
X, section 2, requires water rates to exceed the true cost of supplying that water . . . .”). 
 131. San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 374–77 (emphasis added). 
 132. See Dalhuisen et al., supra note 41, at 304 (“Increasing block rate pricing makes the 
demand for water more elastic . . . .”). 
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courts must clearly articulate that a constitutional conflict exists, and 
then provide a clear roadmap for its resolution. 
The overlapping mandates of the water rights and tax provisions 
of the constitution create a clear conflict over the question of water 
rates. As discussed supra, the 1928 water rights referendum—the 
precursor to today’s article X, section 2—was aimed at imposing 
“reasonable use” restrictions on private water rights for the greater 
public benefit.133 Coming seventy years later, article XIII D, section 6 
of the California Constitution attempted to protect individual interests 
by requiring that fees for government services be strictly proportional 
to the costs.134 While the Palmdale and San Juan Capistrano courts 
found no conflict between the water rights and tax provisions of the 
constitution, a closer look at the development of the water rights 
amendment shows that their reconciliation might not be so simple. In 
Palmdale, the court found that there was no inherent conflict between 
article X’s “reasonable use” restriction and article XIII’s 
proportionality requirement.135 The Palmdale court stated that articles 
X and XIII are not at odds as long as “conservation is attained in a 
manner that ‘shall not exceed the proportional cost of the service 
attributable to the parcel.’”136 Likewise, in San Juan Capistrano, the 
court stated that the emphasis of article X, section 2 is “on a policy 
that favors the beneficial use of water as against the waste of water for 
nonbeneficial uses.”137 The court continued, “nothing in article X, 
section 2, requires water rates to exceed the true cost of supplying that 
water, and in fact pricing water at its true cost is compatible with the 
article’s theme of conservation with a view toward reasonable and 
beneficial use.”138 
While article X, section 2 of the California Constitution does not 
“require” government agencies to set water rates above the cost of 
supplying it, the water rights provision does not preclude government 
agencies from doing so either. In fact, article X, section 2 gives the 
legislature wide latitude to “enact laws in the furtherance of the 
 
 133. Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607, 613 (Cal. 1926). 
 134. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D. 
 135. Palmdale, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 381. 
 136. Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XIII D). 
 137. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 376 
(Ct. App. 2015). 
 138. Id. 
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policy.”139 With that authority, the legislature has passed a water code 
that includes statutes to encourage conservation, incentivize recycled 
water use, and monitor groundwater levels.140 In addition, California 
Water Code sections 370 through 374 authorize municipal 
governments to impose “allocation-based conservation water pricing” 
as a means to prevent water waste “in the interest of the people and for 
the public welfare, within the contemplation of section 2 of article X 
of the California Constitution.”141 
The Palmdale and San Juan Capistrano courts would authorize 
allocation-based water rates only where they are strictly proportional 
to the cost of supplying water.142 The San Juan Capistrano court 
suggested that, during times of drought, the resulting higher water 
rates would themselves disincentivize water waste.143 However, as the 
above research on water consumption suggests, tiered water rates 
work precisely because strict proportionality between water rates and 
water supply costs are insufficient to promote water conservation.  
In addition, given the complexity and scale of today’s water 
infrastructure, such requirements impose a great burden on utilities 
who must now specifically link water fees to water supply costs for 
millions of individual consumers. Moreover, to the extent that utilities 
are able to justify their tiered rate structures, that justification hinges 
on the mathematical fiction that it is even possible to reconcile the 
specific costs of providing water to millions of discrete consumers—
representing millions of discrete demand profiles—with a one-size-
fits-all rate.144 The Palmdale and San Juan Capistrano courts, 
 
 139. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. Prior to the passage of Proposition 218, the California Court of 
Appeal, First District, in Brydon v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128 (Ct. App. 1994), 
held that the water rights provision of the California constitution permits the use of block-rate 
pricing to encourage water conservation. The court held that higher rates were justified for higher 
users because “[t]o the extent that certain consumers overutilize the resource, they contribute 
disproportionately to the necessity for conservation, and the requirement that the District acquire 
new sources for the supply of domestic water.” Id. at 142. 
 140. Gray et al., supra note 26, at 1650. 
 141. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 370–74 (West 2008). 
 142. City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373, 381 (Ct. App. 2011); 
San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 377. 
 143. See Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 
376 (Ct. App. 2015) (“We would note here that in times of drought—which looks increasingly like 
the foreseeable future—providing water can become very pricey indeed.”). 
 144. In Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Ct. App. 2014), the court 
held that the authors of Proposition 218 likely envisioned different rates for different users based 
on their proportional share of overall water usage. However, given the complexity of the water 
distribution system, the court did not require that fees match costs down to the penny. Id. at 708 
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therefore, appear to set a contradictory standard: on the one hand, 
utilities must be able to clearly correlate water rates to supply costs; 
on the other, the standard for showing the correlation is incredibly low 
and, perhaps, may be based on shaky cost estimates.145 
This standard also calls upon factfinders—generally not well-
versed in the intricacies of water pricing policy—to determine when a 
water provider has met its burden under article XIII. Thus, the 
suggested reconciliation between the constitution’s water and tax 
provisions simply does not work with regard to allocation-based 
conservation water pricing, and, in fact, encourages utilities to skate 
by the rule by conjuring up numerical justifications. 
Neither the San Juan Capistrano nor the Palmdale court was 
forced to resolve the actual conflict between the constitutional 
provisions because they found that the tiered water rates in their 
respective cases could be struck down for lack of a sufficient 
correlation between water fees and costs.146 However, the San Juan 
Capistrano court stated that even if a conflict did exist, article XIII D 
should be read to carve out an exception to article X, section 2 because 
Prop 218 “is both more recent and more specific.”147 Given the fact 
that conflict with regard to tiered water rates appears unavoidable, 
article XIII D would ultimately bar utilities from enacting tiered water 
rates. 
The courts greatly muddy the waters by refusing to acknowledge 
the conflict between the constitution’s tax and water rights provisions 
and then articulating an ambiguous rule in an attempt to reconcile 
them. Moving forward, the courts should acknowledge that a conflict 
is unavoidable with regard to tiered water rates, and articulate clearly 
how that conflict can be resolved. Simply stating, as the San Juan 
Capistrano court did, that Prop 218 constitutes the carving out of an 
“exception” to article X, section 2 does not provide sufficient guidance 
 
(“While it is clear the District’s water measurement system is not perfect, section 6 does not require 
perfection.”). 
 145. San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 373 (“Since City Water didn’t try to calculate 
the actual costs of service for the various tiers, the trial court’s ruling on tiered pricing must be 
upheld simply on the basis of the constitutional text.”). 
 146. See id. at 381; Palmdale, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 381. 
 147. San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 377; see also Greene v. Marin Cty. Flood 
Control & Water Conservation Dist., 231 P.3d 350, 358 (Cal. 2010) (“As a means of avoiding 
conflict, a recent, specific provision is deemed to carve out an exception to and thereby limit an 
older, general provision.”). 
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to future courts on exactly what types of rate structures are allowed 
under state law. 
IV.  CRITIQUE NO. 2: IMPRACTICALITY AND AMBIGUITY IN  
SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO 
The Fourth District of the California Court of Appeals refined the 
rule on tiered rates in its 2015 decision in San Juan Capistrano. Under 
the decision, utilities are no longer allowed to set their rates based on 
system-wide costs for providing water.148 Rather, utilities apparently 
must set their rates in proportion to the cost of supplying water to 
individual parcels. 
This section provides an overview of the San Juan Capistrano 
court’s decision, and explains the differences in reasoning between 
San Juan Capistrano and previous decisions in Pajaro, White and 
California Farm Bureau Federation. Analysis of the San Juan 
Capistrano rule reveals a contradictory reading of Prop 218 on the part 
of the court. This section proposes two possible methods of resolving 
that inconsistency, then advocates for a return to the Pajaro rule in 
which rates are set proportionally to costs at a system-wide level, 
rather than for individual parcels. It also calls on the courts to clear up 
critical ambiguities in the San Juan Capistrano decision to assist 
agencies in setting new rates. 
A.  Summarizing San Juan Capistrano 
In San Juan Capistrano, the California Court of Appeal placed 
new restrictions on how water utilities could set their rates.149 
Abandoning the Pajaro approach, the San Juan Capistrano court 
found that water fees must be proportional to the cost of providing 
water to individual consumers, rather than to the system as a whole.150 
The City of San Juan Capistrano—in its capacity as a retail water 
provider—created four tiers of water pricing based on historical 
patterns of usage ranging from “low” to “very excessive” use.151 The 
city did not try to calculate the incremental cost of providing water for 
each tier, and, in fact, “effectively used revenues from the top tiers to 
 
 148. See San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 372 (“Why use the phrase ‘cost of the 
service to the parcel’ if a local agency doesn’t have to actually ascertain a cost of service to that 
particular parcel?”). 
 149. Id. at 373. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 366. 
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subsidize below-cost rates for the bottom tier.”152 Based on the text of 
article XIII D, section 6 of the California Constitution, the San Juan 
Capistrano court held that the tiered rate structures were 
unconstitutional.153 The court found that the water utility not only had 
to balance its total costs against its total revenues, but “also had to 
correlate its tiered prices with the actual cost of providing water at 
those tiered levels.”154 
B.  Expanding the San Juan Capistrano Rule 
In 2016, the Second District Court of Appeal in Newhall County 
Water District v. Castaic Water Agency,155 extended the San Juan 
Capistrano court’s ruling to include both water retailers and wholesale 
water providers.156 The court struck down wholesale water rates on 
Prop 26 grounds, finding that the price-setting method did not “bear a 
fair or reasonable relationship to the payor’s burdens on, or benefits 
received from” the wholesaler’s activity.157 In addition, the court 
found that wholesalers could not charge retail agencies for 
“groundwater management activities” because “the benefit to the 
retailers from those activities is at best indirect” and, therefore, 
violated article XIII C of the California Constitution.158 Extending San 
Juan Capistrano and directly challenging the rule from Pajaro, the 
court also stated, “Where charges for a government service or product 
are to be allocated among only four payors, the only rational method 
of evaluating their burdens on, or benefits received from, the 
governmental activity, is individually, payor by payor.”159 Put simply: 
a rate structure is only acceptable if the water provider can justify the 
cost for each and every consumer individually, not just the system at 
large. 
C.  The Impracticability of San Juan Capistrano 
Less than two years after San Juan Capistrano, water utilities and 
municipalities are still grappling with the decision’s heightened 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 373. 
 154. Id. (emphasis added). 
 155. 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 429 (Ct. App. 2016). 
 156. Id. at 436–37. 
 157. Id. at 437 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XIII C). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 438. 
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burden to link water costs to water rates. As a matter of policy, it seems 
fair that water consumers should only have to pay fees that correspond 
in some way to the actual cost of providing the water. And, indeed, 
article XIII D of the California Constitution requires as much.160 
However, as seen with the diverging Pajaro and San Juan Capistrano 
decisions, courts have differed on exactly how to balance the benefits 
and costs. Namely, should fees be calculated using costs for each 
individual consumer, for groupings of consumers, or for the system as 
a whole? 
The San Juan Capistrano court held that article XIII D requires 
water utilities to set water fees proportionally to the cost of supplying 
water to individual parcels.161 The court stated: 
If the phrase “proportional cost of the service attributable to 
the parcel” is to mean anything, it has to be that article XIII 
D, section 6, subdivision (b)(3) assumes that there really is 
an ascertainable cost of service that can be attributed to a 
specific—hence that little word “the”—parcel . . . . Why use 
the phrase “cost of the service to the parcel” if a local agency 
doesn’t actually have to ascertain a cost of service to that 
particular parcel?162 
The San Juan Capistrano court’s reading of the constitution’s tax 
provision was an apparent constriction of the Pajaro rule, in which the 
court held that fees could be set proportionally to the cost of providing 
water for a group of consumers or the system as a whole.163 The 
Pajaro court stated: 
Given that Proposition 218 prescribes no particular method 
for apportioning a fee or charge other than that the amount 
shall not exceed the proportional cost of the service 
attributable to the parcel, [the water utility]’s method of 
grouping similar users together for the same augmentation 
 
 160. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D (“The amount of a fee or charge imposed upon any parcel or 
person as an incident of property ownership shall not exceed the proportional cost of the service 
attributable to the parcel.”). 
 161. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 373 
(Ct. App. 2015). 
 162. Id. at 372. 
 163. Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 255 (Ct. App. 
2013). 
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rate and charging the users according to the usage is a 
reasonable way to apportion the cost of service.164 
The Pajaro court also recognized that it may be difficult—or 
perhaps impossible—for water utilities to apportion water costs down 
to the level of the individual parcel.165 In its decision, the Pajaro court 
drew on the finding of the California Supreme Court two years earlier 
in California Farm Bureau Federation v. State Water Resources 
Control Board,166 which also held that “the question of proportionality 
is not measured on an individual basis. Rather, it is measured 
collectively, considering all rate payors.”167 
In Pajaro—as in White and California Farm Bureau before it—
the court set a standard that realistically accounted for the difficulty of 
determining water supply costs for individual parcels and instead 
required only that rates match costs at a system-wide level.168 The San 
Juan Capistrano court’s decision makes no such acknowledgement of 
that reality. 
In addition, requiring proportionality at the level of the individual 
parcel conflicts with the San Juan Capistrano court’s own 
understanding of the California Government Code’s definition of 
water as “any system of public improvements intended to provide for 
the production, storage, supply, treatment or distribution of water from 
any source.”169 The San Juan Capistrano court held that, for purposes 
of its Prop 218 analysis, the law does not distinguish between potable 
and nonpotable water sources because water is part of a “holistic 
distribution system.”170 Water utilities are therefore free to charge 
consumers to supply any combination of potable and nonpotable water 
without having to parse out the exact proportion of the type of water 
being provided. The court reasoned that even if some customers only 
use potable water while others only use nonpotable water, a water 
utility should be free to charge a uniform rate for providing both types 
of water because “[b]oth are getting water that meets their needs. 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 255 (citing White v. Cty. of San Diego, 608 P.2d 728, 731 (Cal. 1980) (en banc)). 
 166. 247 P.3d 112 (Cal. 2011). 
 167. Id. at 124. 
 168. Pajaro, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 255. 
 169. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53750(m) (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
 170. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 370 
(Ct. App. 2015). 
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Nonpotable water for some customers frees up potable water for 
others.”171 
Moreover, the San Juan Capistrano court found that a water 
provider could pass on the present cost of constructing a water 
recycling plant to consumers even if the project would take five years 
to complete.172 According to the court, “Water Code section 31020 
gives local water agencies the power to do acts to ‘furnish sufficient 
water in the district for any present or future beneficial use.’”173 
The San Juan Capistrano court provided contradictory guidance 
in its decision. On the one hand, the court interpreted the constitution 
to require that rates be strictly proportional to the cost of supplying 
water to the individual parcels.174 On the other, the court determined 
that all customers could be charged at a higher rate to account for the 
cost of providing potable water, whether or not an individual customer 
used any potable water, and that current customers could be charged 
for future infrastructure development, whether or not they would reap 
the project’s benefits.175 This leaves open a key question: if article 
XIII D requires that “[t]he amount of a fee or charge imposed upon 
any parcel or person . . . shall not exceed the proportional cost of the 
service attributable to the parcel”, what exactly might “the service 
attributable to the parcel” include?176 
Courts may answer this question in one of two ways: (1) mandate 
that water utilities set rates proportionally to the actual and present 
cost of supplying water to individual parcels; or (2) interpret the 
constitutional provision to set rates proportionally to the cost of 
supplying water to the broader system. 
Under the first option, water utilities would again be forced into 
the difficult—if not impossible—task of quantifying water costs for 
individual parcels. Going even further than the San Juan Capistrano 
rule, utilities would also be required to parse out differences in potable 
and nonpotable water costs, and calculate the present costs of 
infrastructure projects based on estimates of future benefits to 
individual consumers. The court would, therefore, be asking utilities 
to rely on shaky arithmetic to set rates, which might still very well 
 
 171. Id. at 369. 
 172. Id. at 370. 
 173. Id. (quoting CAL. WATER CODE § 31020 (West 1949)). 
 174. See id. at 372. 
 175. See id. at 370. 
 176. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 6. 
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violate Prop 218’s proportionality requirement. In addition, forcing 
utilities to provide such detailed justification would saddle them with 
a large administrative burden, creating a complex and costly morass 
of billing rates, especially for larger urban water districts. 
The second option—which closely resembles the rule adopted by 
the Pajaro, White and California Farm Bureau courts—meets Prop 
218’s proportionality requirement while acknowledging the challenge 
of pricing water accurately. Under this second option, water rates 
would be set based on the costs of providing water across the entire 
system, matching the California Government Code’s definition of 
“water” as a part of a holistic system. The rule would also be consistent 
with the San Juan Capistrano court’s own view that water utilities 
need not distinguish between potable and nonpotable water, and 
present and future costs. 
D.  The Ambiguity of San Juan Capistrano 
In the closing paragraphs of its ruling, the San Juan Capistrano 
court walked back its apparent requirement that fees must match 
supply costs to individual parcels.177 The court appeared to leave the 
door open to rate-setting schemes based on the cost of providing water 
to groupings of customers, rather than individual parcels.178 The court 
wrote that its rejection of the city’s price scheme “is not to say [the 
agency] must calculate a rate for 225 Elm Street and then calculate 
another for the house across the street at 226.”179 Rather, the court 
suggested that a water agency may “figure out the costs of given usage 
levels that require [the agency] to tap more expensive supplies, and 
then bill users in those tiers accordingly.”180 
Here, the court appears to be speaking out of both sides of its 
mouth. While the court suggested that fees need not be atomized to the 
level of the individual household, it did not explicitly state whether 
those groupings would be ruled constitutional either.181 As a result, 
water agencies have been left to determine for themselves what level 
of customer aggregation falls within the San Juan Capistrano 
guidelines. 
 
 177. See San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 380–81. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 380. 
 180. Id. at 381. 
 181. See id. at 380–81 (“This is not to say City Water must calculate a rate for 225 Elm Street 
and then calculate another for the house across the street at 226.”). 
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Given the importance of reducing water consumption in an 
increasingly dry California, water agencies should be given greater 
flexibility to set their rates with an eye toward the twin tasks of 
augmenting water supply and reducing consumer demand. In order to 
clean up the muddle that the San Juan Capistrano rule presents, the 
court should return to its holding from Pajaro: water rates should be 
set proportionally to the cost of supplying water to the broader system, 
not to individual parcels.182 
If the courts are to mandate that agencies link fees to supply costs, 
water agencies deserve guidance on exactly what level of cost-
calculation the law requires. In doing the onerous cost-accounting 
apparently required by San Juan Capistrano, water agencies should 
not have to worry at each turn that a court might strike down their 
tiered rates as unconstitutional. Moving forward, the courts must, 
therefore, provide a framework for water agencies to determine how 
to set rates that do not run afoul of Prop 218. 
V.  TIERED RATES AFTER SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO  
In the aftermath of San Juan Capistrano, government agencies 
and environmental groups across the state expressed concern over the 
future viability of tiered rate structures as a water-conservation 
measure. This section provides a survey of the immediate reactions to 
the decision, and describes the ways in which water agencies have 
incorporated the Court’s rule into new tiered rate structures. Finally, 
this section presents a case study of the Los Angeles Department of 
Water and Power’s new tiered rate structure to show the 
implementation of San Juan Capistrano in action. 
A.  Immediate Aftermath of San Juan Capistrano 
Coming amidst severe drought in California, the San Juan 
Capistrano court decision was pilloried by Governor Jerry Brown as 
putting “a straitjacket on local government at a time when maximum 
flexibility is needed.”183 On June 5, 2015, the California Attorney 
General sent a letter to the California Supreme Court on behalf of the 
 
 182. Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 255 (Ct. App. 
2013). 
 183. Governor Brown Issues Statement on 4th District Court of Appeal Decision, OFF. OF 
GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN, JR. (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.ca.gov/archive/gov39 
/2015/04/20/news18928/index.html. 
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State Water Resources Control Board requesting de-publication of the 
decision to limit its impact on other water agencies across the state.184 
Calling the decision “overbroad” and pointing to potentially 
problematic dicta in the decision, the Attorney General wrote: 
If the opinion remains published, it is likely to create 
confusion for water suppliers, courts, and litigants, and to 
frustrate the State’s efforts to respond to the severe drought 
conditions.185 
The Supreme Court also received letters in support of de-publication 
from the Natural Resources Defense Council,186 the Association of 
California Water Agencies, the California State Association of 
Counties, and the League of California Cities.187 On July 22, 2015, the 
Supreme Court denied all motions and refused to de-publish the 
decision.188 
B.  Emerging Interpretations of San Juan Capistrano 
State officials believed that San Juan Capistrano had the potential 
for far-reaching impact, given that two-thirds of California’s water 
agencies used tiered billing structures at the time of the ruling.189 As 
anticipated, a number of water agencies have faced legal challenges to 
 
 184. Letter from Kamala Harris, Attorney Gen., State of Cal. Dep’t of Justice, to Justices of the 
Sup. Ct. of Cal. (June 5, 2015) (on file with the California State Water Resources Control Board), 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/drought/pricing/docs/capistra
no_depub_request.pdf (following the San Juan Capistrano ruling, the City of San Juan Capistrano 
withdrew its petition for rehearing and did not file an appeal with the California Supreme Court). 
 185. Id. at 7. 
 186. Letter from Nat. Res. Def. Council, to Justices of the Sup. Ct. of Cal. (2015) (on file with 
author). 
 187. Letter from Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies, Cal. State Ass’n of Ctys. & League of Cal. 
Cities, to Justices of the Sup. Ct. of Cal. (June 5, 2015), https://www.cacities.org/Resources-
Documents/Member-Engagement/Professional-Departments/City-Attorneys/Request-Amicus-
Support/Recent-Filings/Letters/Capistrano-Taxpayers-Association-v-City-of-San-Jua. 
 188. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, No. S226906, 2015 Cal. 
LEXIS 5268 (July 22, 2015). 
 189. See Morgan Cook, Water Rate Scheme Struck Down, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Apr. 20, 
2015, 9:51 PM), http://www. 
sandiegouniontribune.com/news/watchdog/sdut-san-juan-capistrano-water-rate-case-2015apr20-
htmlstory.html; Matt Stevens, State Attorney General Challenges Ruling Against Tiered Water 
Rates, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2015, 7:39 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ag-
challenges-water-rul 
ing-20150611-story.html?utm_source=dlvr.itutm_medium=twitterdlvrit=649324. 
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their rate structures in the wake of San Juan Capistrano, with lawsuits 
still pending in the state courts.190 
While the San Juan Capistrano court seemed to suggest that 
higher-tiered rates must match specific supply costs to individual 
parcels, water agencies have construed certain language in the 
decision to mean that rates may instead be set based on an average of 
the marginal cost for supplying water to all parcels in a given tier.191 
The San Juan Capistrano court said, in dicta: 
[W]e see nothing in article XIII, section 6, subdivision (b)(3) 
[of the California Constitution] that is incompatible with 
water agencies passing on the true, marginal cost of water to 
those consumers whose extra use of water forces water 
agencies to incur higher costs to supply that extra water.192 
C.  Los Angeles Department of Water and Power – A Case Study 
The new rate structure introduced in 2016 by the Los Angeles 
Department of Water and Power (“DWP”)—the nation’s largest 
municipal water utility193—provides a good illustration of how 
utilities are justifying their rates in San Juan Capistrano’s wake. 
On April 15, 2016, one year after San Juan Capistrano, DWP 
implemented a new rate structure, meant to last through the year 
 
 190. See, e.g., Arin Mikailian, Group Files Suit Over Glendale’s Tiered Water Rates, L.A. 
TIMES (May 8, 2015, 5:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/tn-gnp-group-files-suit-over-glendales-
tiered-water-rates-20150508-story.html; Paul Rogers, California Drought: Wealthy Hillsborough 
Residents Sue, Saying Water Rates Are Too High, MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 30, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.mercury 
news.com/2016/11/30/california-drought-wealthy-hillsborough-residents-sue-saying-water-rates-
are-too-high/; Claire Trageser, Lawsuit Threatens Sweetwater’s Tiered Water Rates But Not San 
Diego’s, KPBS (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.kpbs.org/news/2015/apr/21/sweetwaters-tiered-
water-rates-threatened-lawsuit-/ (plaintiff in the lawsuit against Sweetwater, CA was represented 
by the same lawyer who brought suit in the San Juan Capistrano case); Nick Welsh, Farmers Sue 
Goleta Water District, SANTA BARBARA INDEP. (Sept. 3, 2015), 
http://www.independent.com/news/2015/sep/03/farmers-sue-goleta-water-district. 
 191. Kelly J. Salt, Structuring Tiered Water Rates Under Conflicting Court Decisions: 
Interpreting the California Constitution, 108 J. - AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N 32, 38 (2016) (citing 
Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 381 (Ct. App. 
2015)) (“[T]he court noted that there was nothing in the record to explain why the city could not 
calculate the costs of service at given usage levels that require it to tap into more expensive water 
supplies and then bill its users in the higher tiers accordingly.”). 
 192. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 381 
(Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis added). 
 193. About Us: Who We Are, L.A. DEP’T OF WATER & POWER, 
https://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/faces/ladwp/aboutus/awhoweare?_adf.ctrlstate=q8e8hveqs_4&_af
rLoop=386119097889823 (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) [hereinafter LADWP, About Us]. 
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2020.194 The development of the revised rate structure was guided by 
Mayor Eric Garcetti’s Executive Directive 5, issued on October 14, 
2014, which ordered a 20 percent reduction in potable water use by 
2017 and a 50 percent reduction by 2024.195 To that end, DWP 
expressly stated that its rate structure would “continue to incentivize 
conservation, using water budget allotments and tiered rates.”196 
However, DWP acknowledged that its ability to set tiered rates was 
limited by Prop 218 and the Pajaro decision.197 In its Water System 
Rate Action Report of July 2015, DWP quotes language from the San 
Juan Capistrano decision, which says that “there is nothing in 
Proposition 218 that prevents water agencies from passing on the 
incrementally higher costs of expensive water to incrementally higher 
users.”198 However, DWP made no mention of the portions of the 
same decision pertaining to individual parcel costs, and instead states 
that it has “elected to set its rates by customer class.”199 
The stated goal of DWP’s new rate structure is “to ensure revenue 
from each customer class is relatively proportionate to the cost of 
providing service to that class.”200 DWP has established four broad 
customer classes: (1) Single-Dwelling Unit Residential; (2) Multi-
Family Residential; (3) Commercial; and (4) Other, which includes 
recycled water service and private water service.201 There are four 
 
 194. City of L.A., Cal., Water Rate Ordinance 184130 (Apr. 15, 2016), 
https://www.bomagla.org/sites/bomagla.org/files/City%20of%20LA%20Water%20Rate%20Ordi
nance%204-15-16.pdf.  
 195. Executive Directive from Eric Garcetti, Mayor, City of L.A., (Oct. 14, 2014), 
https://www.lamayor.org/sites/g/files/wph446/f/page/file/ED_5_-
_Emergency_Drought__Response_-_Creating_a_Water_Wise_City.pdf?1426620015.  
 196. L.A. DEP’T OF WATER & POWER, WATER SYSTEM RATE ACTION REPORT, CHAPTER 2: 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND, (2015), https://www.ladwp.com/cs/idcplg?IdcService 
=GET_FILE&dDocName=OPLADWPCCB435622&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased 
[hereinafter LADWP, CHAPTER 2]. 
 197. Id. (“The California Court of Appeal decision concerning Proposition 218 (Griffith vs. 
Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency, Sixth Appellate District) that supports grouping similar 
customers into classes and setting rates by customer class as a reasonable way to apportion the cost 
of service.”). 
 198. L.A. DEP’T OF WATER & POWER, WATER SYSTEM RATE ACTION REPORT, CHAPTER 5: 
WATER RATE DESIGN, (2015), https://www.ladwp.com/cs/idcplg?IdcService 
=GET_FILE&dDocName=OPLADWPCCB43562&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased 
[hereinafter LADWP, CHAPTER 5]. 
 199. See id. 
 200. Id. (emphasis added). 
 201. Finances & Reports: Water Rates, L.A. DEP’T OF WATER & POWER (last visited Feb. 18, 
2017), https://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/faces/ladwp/aboutus/a-financesandreports/a-fr-
waterrares?_adf.ctrl-state=mtdykfrui_4&_afrLoop=228335324196460. 
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block rate tiers applied to customers within the Single-Dwelling Unit 
Residential class: Tier 1 (Basic Indoor Use); Tier 2 (Efficient Drought 
Resistant Water Use); Tier 3 (Above Average Outdoor Water Use); 
and Tier 4 (Excessive Use).202 Tiered rates are further differentiated 
based on the lot size of each single-dwelling unit, with five “Lot Size 
Groups” ranging from Group 1 (1–7,499 square feet) to Group 5 
(43,560 square feet and above).203 In the summer months (June to 
September), tiered pricing also differs based on a unit’s temperate 
zone, with lots in cooler areas paying less than those in warmer 
areas.204 
Under DWP’s volumetric rate scheme, the rate customers pay for 
their water depends on how much water they use.205 For each tier, 
DWP sets “water budget allotments” to determine how much water is 
available to Single-Dwelling Unit Residential customers at that tier 
price.206 For example, if the allotment for the First Tier is set at 100 
volumetric units, then customers pay the First Tier price for the first 
100 units, and the Second Tier price for the 101st unit of water and 
beyond. Reducing the allotment available at the lower tiers suppresses 
demand as customers use up their allotment of cheaper water more 
quickly and subsequently reduce usage of higher-priced water.207 
DWP has developed a complex system for determining how much 
to charge for water at each tier. DWP water rates are generally 
comprised of a base rate, which includes the cost of general operations 
and administration, and various “adjustment factors,” which may 
include costs of adding to the water supply, enhancing water quality, 
and improving infrastructure.208 Under the DWP scheme, the key 
“adjustment factors” for setting tiered rates are the “Peak Pumping and 
Storage” and “Water Supply Cost” adjustments.209 At the lower tiers, 
DWP uses cheaper sources of water to fill consumer demand, and 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Customer Service: Water Rates, L.A. DEP’T OF WATER & POWER, 
https://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/faces/wcnav_externalId/r-cs-wtr-rate?_adf.ctrl-
state=33ihh6nu4_4&_afrLoop=462475787070242 (last visited Feb. 18, 2017). 
 204. Id. 
 205. LADWP, CHAPTER 5, supra note 198. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. (see table for a clear breakdown of the sources of costs that form the basis of DWP’s 
rate-setting). 
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therefore can charge less for each unit of water it delivers.210 As 
consumer demand increases, however, DWP is forced to find and 
distribute more expensive sources of imported water-as captured by 
the “Water Supply Cost Adjustment”—and invest more in costly 
water supply and storage programs—as captured by the “Peak 
Pumping and Storage Adjustment.”211 
DWP develops rates—the marginal price per unit of water—for 
each customer class by dividing overall water supply costs by the 
number of units required.212 At the higher tiers, DWP then adds 
marginal cost values for additional water supply and storage measures 
necessitated by higher water demand across the class of users.213 For 
example, under the DWP rate scheme, only Tier 4 and 5 customers 
pay for “Peak Pumping and Storage” because storage is only necessary 
when there is a high volume of water demanded.214 
DWP sets rates for customers based on how much their individual 
usage contributes to overall water supply costs for their class, rather 
than the actual cost of providing water to each individual parcel.215 
Given the complexity of DWP’s water distribution system, the cost of 
service does not align perfectly with revenue, meaning that revenue 
collected from some customer classes slightly exceeds the cost of 
providing water to that class.216 Indeed, with 681,000 water customers 
across Los Angeles County,217 DWP would likely find perfectly 
matching water supply costs to revenue for each parcel an onerous, if 
not impossible, undertaking. 
In creating its new rate structure, DWP has hung its hat on the 
Pajaro decision, which “supports grouping similar customers into 
classes and setting rates by customer class as a reasonable way to 
apportion the cost of service.”218 In doing so, DWP has adopted an 
 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id. (“The calculation of each of the remaining adjustment factors . . . is based on the 
total aggregate revenue requirement for each factor divided by total aggregate usage of Schedules 
A, B, and C.”). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. (“[R]ates can be set to produce revenue from each major customer class 
proportionately to the costs of service for that customer class.”). 
 216. See id. While variances between the cost of service and revenue exist, DWP considers a 
variance of less than 10% to be “reasonable,” and has successfully kept variances below that level. 
See id. 
 217. LADWP, About Us, supra note 193.  
 218. LADWP, CHAPTER 2, supra note 196. 
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expansive reading of San Juan Capistrano, turning away from an 
interpretation of the decision that would require a more-atomized 
accounting of water delivery fees—perhaps even down to the level of 
the individual parcel.219 The apparent split in California appellate 
court decisions on the method for setting tiered rates means that, 
should DWP’s tiered rates ever face a legal challenge, the trial courts 
may choose to apply the rule from either case.220 However, absent 
guidance from the California Supreme Court on how agencies must 
link supply costs to consumer fees, DWP and water agencies across 
California can never be certain that their tiered rates comply fully with 
the law.221 This must change. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
After San Juan Capistrano, the growing body of case law on 
tiered water rates emerging out of the California Court of Appeals has 
turned rate-setting into an untenable guessing game. By first refusing 
to reconcile the contradictory water rights and tax provisions of the 
California constitution, and secondly laying down impracticable and 
ambiguous rules for setting tiered water rates, the California courts 
have left water agencies to determine for themselves what level of 
customer aggregation falls within the San Juan Capistrano guidelines. 
Moving forward, the courts must provide a framework for water 













 219. See Salt, supra note 191, at 40. 
 220. See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara Cty., 369 P.2d 937, 940 (Cal. 
1962) (holding that when conflicting appellate court decisions exist, “the court exercising inferior 
jurisdiction can and must make a choice between the conflicting decisions.”). 
 221. See Salt, supra note 191, at 40. 
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